Necessary Roughness

I’ve just finished Michelle Malkin’s new book, In Defense of Internment: The Case for ‘Racial Profiling’ in World War II and the War on Terror. The book is compelling and chock-full of evidence from public and de-classified sources. I’ve not taken so many notes from a book since college.

The author debunks several myths:

That the removal of Japanese from military areas was based on racial discrimination with no hard evidence. Declassified information gathered with the Office of Naval Intelligence’s MAGIC system revealed spy networks in Honolulu, Los Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco, with operatives that numbered in the hundreds–200+ in Honolulu alone. There were multiple incidents where a Japanese spy’s appeal to people of Japanese descent turned those people to the service of the Emperor. Even after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Japanese subversive groups bought over $900,000 in Japanese war bonds. Some Japanese retained dual Japanese and American citizenship - Japanese to show their loyalty, and American to keep from being deported. Some children born of Japanese in America (and hence American citizens) were sent back to Japan for schooling and then returned to the States. These were the most prolific collaborators. Some of the spy rings were not sent to trial because the Justice Department deferred to the State department, who was still trying to establish diplomatic relations in 1940. The spies, using their encryption, sent back economic and military data to the homeland, and established themselves with socialists (surprised?) and labor unions (AFL-CIO in particular). Also, the MAGIC documents provided networks only of Japanese origin — there were no clues to the existence of large elaborate networks on behalf of Germany and Italy. The original conclusion of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, as liberally stacked if not more stacked than the 9/11 Commission, came to the racism conclusion without benefit of the not-yet-declassified MAGIC information.

That internment was an American-only phenomena. Canada and Mexico both evacuated Japanese from their western shores before the United States did.

That life in the internment camps was harsh like Nazi concentration camps. Initially, the camps were set up for those who could not find work in non-military areas, and people were free to come and go. Later, they were free to leave the camp so long as they found work or attended school and demonstrated that they were not a threat to the United States. Some people actually sought the protection of the camps to avoid harrassment by those loyal to Japan. The barbed wire and guards actually kept people out in most instances, and military police were only allowed in the camp when asked by the camp’s administration, which included camp residents.

That all those who were detained were Japanese-Americans. One third of those detained were Japanese immigrants who had no American citizenship. Citizens of those countries with which we were at war, Germans and Italians, were also detained in camps. We also brought in those Germans and Italians that were involved in Nazi operations in South America.

That Ronald Reagan’s 1988 reparations were warranted and necessary. Prior to 1988, there were already 9 laws on the books with respect to reparations, including the first one, the Evacuation Claims Act of 1948. In that law, people had to show proof in documentation that they were wrongfully affected by the evacuation. The 1988 law awarded Japanese-Americans despite not having proof of harm, and under the courts the entitlement was expanded to those who were born in the camp.

That we should avoid race as a contributing factor for determining the threat ability of a person. Norm Mineta, the Secretary of Transportation and originally hired by Bill Clinton, vehemently opposes any use of racial information in determining who is a threat, because of what he felt was unjust racial discrimination by FDR. The author also notes that in today’s society, Islamists seeking to harm the US are using the same legal loopholes that the Japanese spy networks used over 50 years ago. Imams and lawyers for prisoners assist in establishing networks and sharing intelligence. Al Qaeda manuals contain instructions on how to work the Western legal system. This just seems to be common sense: I doubt Christians, atheists, or Buddhists will be expecting 72 virgins in heaven when their end comes.

Another interesting tidbit is the willingness of Presidential nominees of the time to curtail their campaigns where it hurt the country. Thomas Dewey was preparing to attack President Truman on Pearl Harbor intelligence, but in order to do that he had to use information gathered with the MAGIC system. When advised that MAGIC was still being used to decrypt Japanese documents, Dewey ceased. Those were the days.

The actual case lasts for only half the book. The second half contains appendices filled with declassified documents from MAGIC and other sources sensitive at the time. Michelle Malkin notes that some of the research is even available online. Given the available evidence, one definitely finds the prevailing revisionist history of Japanese internment challenged and wanting. This book is necessary and sufficient reference to keep on your bookshelf and bring out whenever your kids hit the WWII chapter in high school.